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This article provides a critical examination of the contribution that statecraft theory, 
which has been subject to recent revision and development, makes to the literature 
on institutional change. It articulates an emergent neo-statecraft approach that 
offers an agent-led form of historical institutionalism. This overcomes the common 
criticism that historical institutionalists underplay the creative role of actors. The 
article also argues that the approach brings back into focus the imperatives of 
electoral politics as a source of institutional change and provides a macro theory of 
change which is also commonly missing from historical institutionalist work. It can 
therefore identify previously unnoticed sources of stability and change, especially in 
states with strong executives and top-down political cultures. 
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Statecraft theory, originally developed by Jim Bulpitt, has traditionally been considered to be 
outside the mainstream of British, let alone comparative, political science. However, the approach 
is now gaining critical acclaim. Bulpitt’s article in Political Studies (1986a) was recently amongst 
the twelve ‘top voted’ articles published in the journal between 1953 and 2010. David Marsh 
(2012: 48–9) has recently argued that the statecraft approach is a key alternative organising 
perspective to understanding British governance. Moreover the approach has been applied to 
new problems and has been developed by a second wave of scholarship. Yet many, especially 
outside the study of British politics, remain unfamiliar with the statecraft approach, and its 
contribution to key contemporary debates in political science has not been assessed. 
This article considers the ‘added value’ that statecraft theory may have for contemporary 
theories of institutional change. Explaining institutional change remains a central puzzle for new 
institutionalists. Since March and Olsen’s (1984) claim that institutions matter, a huge variety of 
institutionalisms have proliferated (Hall and Taylor 1996; Lowndes 1996; Lowndes and Roberts 
2013; Peters 1999). However, explaining both continuity and change remains a central challenge 
(Hall 2010: 204). Bulpitt’s earlier work on territorial relations has been framed as a historical 
institutionalist approach (Bradbury 2006, 2010), but there has been no similar analysis of the 
statecraft approach, which crystallized much of this thinking about politics or the way in which 
the statecraft approach has evolved by recent scholarship. It is noteworthy that in Lowndes and 
Roberts’ recent book Why Institutions Matter (2013), Bulpitt and statecraft receive no mention.  
This article distils a neo-statecraft framework based on the more recent scholarship and 
argues that it makes three distinctive contributions to the existing literature on institutional 
change. First, it offers an agent-led form of historical institutionalism which overcomes the 
common criticism that historical institutionalists underplay the creative role of actors. Second, 
the approach brings back into focus the imperatives of electoral politics as a source of institutional 
change which is commonly missing from historical institutionalist work. Third, it provides a macro 
theory of change. Neo-statecraft theory can therefore identify previously unnoticed sources of 
stability and change, especially in states with strong executives and top-down political cultures. 
The article begins by sketching out the neo-statecraft approach before reviewing historical 
institutionalist accounts of change and the criticisms levelled against it. The case for the 
contribution of the statecraft approach is then made. 
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FROM STATECRAFT TO NEO-STATECRAFT 
The study of political elites and leaders is one of the cornerstones of political science and 
of central importance to any society. Statecraft is a framework for studying this terrain which was 
first developed by British academic Jim Bulpitt in his 1986 Political Studies article on the Thatcher 
administration’s approach to economic policy. Jim Bulpitt’s earlier work (1967) focused on parties 
in local politics, and territorial relations in Territory and Power (Bulpitt [1983]2008). However, it 
was his statecraft approach which crystallized his ideas on government and governance. He later 
used it to understand a range of other issues, such as the relationship between local and central 
government (Bulpitt 1989), race relations (Bulpitt 1986b), foreign policy and Europe (Bulpitt 
1988). Economic policy retained a central focus (Bulpitt and Burnham 1999). 
The statecraft approach is concerned with how political elites confront and respond to 
governing challenges. Analytical primacy is given to the court which ‘will include the formal Chief 
Executive plus his/her political friends and advisors’ (Bulpitt 1995: 518), who are assumed to be 
self-interested, rational and cohesive actors. The court’s primary concern is to achieve successful 
statecraft; the ‘art of winning elections and achieving some necessary degree of governing 
competence in office’ (Bulpitt 1986a: 21). It does not therefore (necessarily) try to govern in the 
national interest, or on the basis of ideological views. What matters is winning, and winning again. 
It will seek to achieve this through the use of ‘governing codes’ which are a ‘set of relatively 
coherent principles or rules underlying policies and policy related behaviour’ (Bulpitt 1996: 1097) 
and ‘a set of political support mechanisms designed to protect and promote the code and 
objectives’ (Bulpitt 1996: 1097). The original support mechanisms were party management, a 
winning electoral strategy, political argument hegemony and, most importantly, governing 
competence (Bulpitt 1986a: 22). Courts operated within a structural context which affected their 
ability to achieve successful statecraft (Bulpitt 1988: 185). 
The approach has been subject to criticism. Rhodes has claimed there is no counterfactual 
to the approach (Rhodes 1988: 33). Bulpitt ([1983]2008: 239) accepted that ‘the thesis [is] 
untestable, [it] cannot be disproved’. Bulpitt was criticized too for being ‘no system builder’. Much 
of his later work was unpublished and on some points contradictory (Rhodes and Tiernan 2013). 
It has also been suggested that many of the concepts used were vague and ill-defined, making 
them unusable for empirical research (Evans 2006: 53). Finally, the approach has been criticized 
for being reductionist (Marsh 1995). Social and political change is multi-causal but statecraft is an 
account of change which is organized by and around the interests of one actor.  
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However, a second wave of scholarship has taken statecraft theory beyond its original 
formulation. The contours of a neo-statecraft approach are now clear. Firstly, there has been a 
concern to establish the epistemological and ontological position of the approach. Buller (1999: 
691) argued that it was a neglect of these issues that left the approach open to the criticism of 
being ‘reductionist and insensitive to empirical criticism’. He anchored the approach within the 
realism of Andrew Sayer (1992). Meanwhile, James (2012: 76–9) uses critical realism. This position 
assumes that there are separate domains of reality and that not all social phenomena and 
relationships, including elite activity, are directly observable. The observable should often be 
considered as the ‘effects of these (unobservable) causal mechanisms’ (Savigny 2007: 37). 
Positivist falsification based on observation is therefore not an appropriate strategy for testing 
the approach.  
Secondly, some of the contradictory ideas and concepts have been teased out and replaced 
to enable ‘system building’. Buller and James (2014), for example, have undertaken work on the 
issue of structure and agency by criticizing Bulpitt’s concept of the natural rate of governability 
and replaced it with the concept of a structural context.  
Thirdly, there has been a move to consider how some of Bulpitt’s concepts, such as 
governing competence and party management, can be operationalized using research from 
comparative party politics (Buller and James 2012). These have been applied to help assess 
political leaders (also see Buller and James 2012; Stacey 2013). 
Fourthly, the concepts from the approach have been argued to be useful for understanding 
politics across time and space and at different levels of governance. James (2012) uses the 
approach to understand the reform of election administration in the US, UK and Ireland. Stacey 
(2013) has made the case for using the approach to assess French political leaders. McKenna 
(2012) argues that Bulpitt’s statecraft concepts can be applied to local government. Savitch and 
Osgood (2010) used Bulpitt’s earlier work on territorial relations to understand urban policy in 
the US. The approach is no longer necessarily focused on British politics. Instead, it focuses on 
identifying regularities and trajectories in elite governance across time and space. 
Lastly, the approach has been developed explicitly to explain institutional change. Bulpitt 
was clearly concerned with constitutional management in the British polity in his earlier book, 
Territory and Power ([1983]2008). However, the importance of constitutional management was 
not explicitly embedded in the core support mechanisms of the statecraft approach. James (2012) 
thus argues that there should be a fifth support mechanism to statecraft theory: bending the rules 
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of the game. From this perspective, institutions are considered to be formal, legal-political rules 
that can be enforced by third parties rather than informal ‘anthropological’ ones.1  
Neo-statecraft theory therefore responds significantly to the criticisms that have been 
levelled at it to date and lays the path for significant system building. However, there has been no 
assessment of the contribution that this approach makes to the analysis of the causes of 
institutional change and continuity, which is a central question in political science. Analysis has so 
far focused on Bulpitt’s earlier text, Territory and Power, with Bradbury (2006, 2010) arguing that 
the approach was historical institutionalist. For Bradbury (2010: 320), Territory and Power ‘was 
the more difficult mother work to which “The Thatcher Statecraft” was the later offspring’. 
Territory and Power, Bradbury argues (2006: 559), was a ‘realist historical institutionalist account 
of UK territorial politics’ which should be seen as part of ‘the intellectual turn since the 1980s 
towards temporal analysis of political development’ (Bradbury 2010: 318). Bulpitt’s work on 
territorial relations, argues Bradbury (2010: 318), stressed a need to understand political 
development in a long-term context, a concern that temporal political science should try to 
‘periodize modern and contemporary history better' (Bradbury 2010: 339) and a discomfort with 
historians and political scientists laying claim to predictive knowledge – all key aspects of historical 
institutionalism. Moreover, Bulpitt built explanations of change in territorial relations on many of 
the concepts and terms commonly used by historical institutionalists to explain change, such as 
path dependency, positive feedback mechanisms and critical junctures (Bradbury 2010: 335–6). 
Clearly, Bulpitt’s original statecraft approach might have emerged from his earlier work. However, 
there is a need to consider the contribution of the more recent framework. To do this, a review 
of historical institutionalism and the problems that it faces in explaining change is required. 
 
THE FAILURES OF HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
 
The central assumptions of historical institutionalism,2 writes Elizabeth Sanders (2006: 39), 
are that: ‘human political interactions should be studied (a) in the context of rule structures that 
are themselves human creations; and (b) sequentially … rather than to take a snapshot if those 
interactions at only point in time, and in isolation from the rule structures (institutions) in which they 
occur’. Historical institutionalists distinguish themselves from rational choice 
institutionalists by emphasizing how the motives and actions of actors depend on the 
social-historical institutional setting (Adcock et al. 2007: 280). They distinguished 
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themselves from sociological institutionalists by having concerns about power at the 
forefront of the analysis. 
Institutional development is typically characterized as being prone to long periods of 
stability punctuated by rare and brief periods of instability in which change is possible, but not 
inevitable (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 341). The long periods of stability are explained through 
the concept of path dependencies. Mahoney (2000: 507, 510) defines these as ‘causal processes 
that are highly sensitive to events that take place in the early stages of an overall historical 
sequence’. Early historical events influence, but do not completely determine, future outcomes. 
There remains a role for contingency over a series of events and relative uncertainty. He identifies 
two different types of dependencies. The first are self-reinforcing sequences, in which ‘initial steps 
in a particular direction influence further movement in the same direction such that over time it 
becomes difficult or impossible to reverse direction’ (Mahoney 2000: 512). Path-dependencies 
are therefore mechanisms whereby institutional reproduction is ensured or ‘locked in’ over time. 
Mahoney’s second dependency type are reactive sequences, which are ‘chains of temporarily 
ordered and causally connected events’ (Mahoney 2000: 526). One event can set in motion a 
sequence of events and therefore influence institutional development. 
Path dependencies are thought to be usually so strong that change can only occur during critical 
junctures. Capoccia and Kelemen (2007: 343) define these as: ‘‘A situation in which the structural 
(that is, economic, cultural, ideological and organizational) influences on political action are 
significantly relaxed for a relatively short period with two main consequences: the range of 
plausible choices open to powerful political actors expands substantially and the consequences 
of their decisions for the outcome of interest are potentially much more momentous’. These 
moments are often described through metaphor. Krasner (1984, 1988) invokes a metaphor of the 
changes to an animal species, which might occur due to external shocks such as climate change 
or environmental disaster. Elsewhere, they referred to as times of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1991). On these occasions path-dependencies can be broken by the 
‘contingent’ actions of actors or events and change can, but won’t necessarily, occur. 
 
An Explanation of Continuity not Change? 
The traditional criticism of the historical institutionalist literature is that its explanation of change 
is not satisfactory. Peters et al. (2005: 954–5) suggest that there is no theory of change because 
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the aim is to explain continuity. The concepts of critical junctures and punctuated equilibrium 
make the sources of change exogenous to the model and do not help identify what they might 
be; they ‘fall outside of the existing scientific theory’ (Mahoney, 2000: 514). As Steinmo et al. 
(1992: 15) famously commented: ‘institutions explain everything until they explain nothing. 
Institutions are an independent variable and explain political outcomes in periods of stability, but 
when they break down, they become the dependent variable… the logic of the argument is 
reversed from “institutions shape politics” to “Politics shape institutions”.’ Historical 
institutionalist theories therefore appear weak at explaining how and why macro phenomena 
penetrate meso and micro levels (also see: Mahoney and Thelan 2010: 6–7).  
More recent work on institutions has developed partially with this criticism in mind. A range 
of studies in a collection edited by Streek and Thelan (2005) explain how transformative change 
can result from the accumulation of gradual and incremental changes which create ‘tipping 
points’ for more dramatic change. They argue that change can therefore be endogenous to 
institutions as it results from ‘inherent ambiguities and “gaps” that exist by design or emerge over 
time between formal institutions and their actual implementation or enforcement’ (Streek and 
Thelan 2005: 19). They develop five modes of institutional change: displacement, layering, drift, 
conversion and exhaustion.3 These are both a descriptive typology of the ways in which 
institutions might change and a way of explaining institutional change. The concept of drift, for 
example, explains how institutions require ‘active maintenance; to remain what they are, how 
they need to be reset and refocused, or sometimes more fundamentally recalibrated or 
renegotiated, in response to changes in the political and economic environment in which they are 
embedded’ (Streek and Thelan 2005: 24). In short, institutions themselves can be a force of 
institutional change because they are dynamic entities. The criticism that too much remains 
exogenous has therefore been partially answered but still has resonance. 
 
Structure and Agency  
A second concern commonly raised about historical institutionalism is its position on structure 
and agency. Historical institutionalists are accused of giving institutions too much power over 
individuals: they demonstrate how the institutional setting in which individuals live influences 
their behaviour but how can individuals shape institutions? According to Peters (1999:71): ‘There 
appears to be an implicit assumption of the approach that when individuals choose to participate 
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in an institution they will accept the constraints imposed by that institution, but that linkage is 
not explored directly by scholars working in the tradition’.Instead, as Mahoney (2000: 514) notes, 
‘the specific choices and “agency” of particular individuals’ tend to be listed among those factors 
which are ‘contingent’ and are therefore given less theoretical or empirical examination 
themselves. For Hay and Wincott (1998: 957): ‘historical institutionalism . . . offers great potential. 
Whether that potential will be realized, however, depends ultimately on the willingness of 
institutionalists . . . to pose again the fundamental and difficult question of the relationship 
between agents and structures, between institutional architects, institutionalised subjects and 
institutional environments’.  
More recent institutional theory notes that agency can be important at particularly 
contingent moments. Ira Katznelson (2003), for example, argues that institutional path 
dependencies are central during ‘settled’ times but agency becomes important during ‘unsettled‘ 
times. All four of the modes of institutional change identified by Mahoney and Thelan (2010) 
involve an agent of one form or another. However, while there are elements of agency in some 
of the work considered to be historical institutionalist, it is worth remembering that the historical 
institutionalism paradigm was self-consciously constructed to make the point that change is not 
easy and that human agency matters less than we normally think. It therefore retains the claim 
that only in exceptional circumstances do agents trump institutions (also see Mendez 2012: 154–
6).  
However, might Katznelson’s ‘unsettled times’ be a more general condition than originally 
thought? In many contexts there might be powerful agents who can readily break institutional 
path dependencies. In some contexts, might agency be more important than structure? 
Examining when, where and how crucial agents seek to break path-dependencies can therefore 
make a crucial contribution to understanding institutional development. In the context of 
majoritarian democracy with top-down political cultures, this article argues, statecraft is 
important.  
Statecraft as historical institutionalism 
 
This brief review of historical institutionalism allows the contribution of neo-statecraft theory to 
be identified. Neo-statecraft theory fits with historical institutionalism in four overlapping ways. 
Firstly, the statecraft approach continued Bulpitt’s concerns with historical context and temporal 
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development present in Territory and Power. Bulpitt became increasingly vocal about the need 
for a historical understanding of politics because of his dissatisfaction with the state of the 
academic disciplines of British political science and history and their interrelationship. According 
to Bulpitt, these two academic subjects shared (or should share) empirical material and analytical 
analysis but in short did not ‘speak’ to one another. Bulpitt (1995: 510) was concerned that 
political science:  ‘now has a less systematic and continuous interest in the past than sociology, 
economics, and, even, geography. Contemporary political science is confined to a laager called 
“the present”, which is increasingly and profitably penetrated by these rival disciplines.’ For him, 
‘the 1190s are as interesting and as important as the 1990s’ (Bulpitt 1996: 1094). Political science 
had developed a disease of ‘presentism’ by limiting the basis of empirical research. The result was 
the importing of ‘rented histories’, where political scientists borrowed accounts of the past from 
historians to contextualize their own research of the present. This left political scientists reliant 
on other disciplines’ and researchers’ analysis and assumptions. One example that Bulpitt (1996) 
cites is the ‘post-war consensus’, which he empirically disputes, but which formed the basis of 
much subsequent analysis of Thatcherism and New Labour in the UK. Bulpitt (1995, 1996) 
therefore tried ‘to reformulate . . . [political science’s] connection with the past’. He argued that 
‘political science would benefit from another attempt to reformalise its connections with past 
politics’ in the form of analysis of historical politics (Bulpitt 1995: 510). Two of the most recent 
applications of statecraft theory have sought to understand change in a historical perspective. 
James (2012) studies how partisan interest in changing certain electoral rules varies over time – 
from the franchise becoming widespread to the present day. Buller’s analysis (2000) of the court’s 
position towards the European Union is situated into the historical development of post-war 
British politics. 
Secondly, the use of concepts such as critical junctures continued. Bulpitt periodized 
twentieth-century British politics into statecraft regimes. However, the effectiveness of these 
regimes was undermined by exogenous developments. The birth of electoral democracy, for 
example, forced professional elite politicians into a major reconsideration of statecraft strategy 
because it gave rise to demands for responsibility for macro-economic policy in a context of a 
profoundly uncompetitive economy, and a weak external security position (Bulpitt 1996: 1098–
103). Subsequent critical junctures identified by Bulpitt (1988: 188–91) included the emergence 
of an open polity in the 1980s. 
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A third important convergence between neo-statecraft and historical institutionalism is the 
theory of actor motivation explicit in the statecraft approach. For Bulpitt, the court is a rational, 
self-interested actor. The assumptions of self-interest and rationality have strong connotations in 
political science because they are the core assumptions of rational choice theory. But the 
statecraft approach should not be misinterpreted as a rational choice approach. Bulpitt claims 
that those assumptions of politicians are justified because of the particular institutional and 
historical context in which elites find themselves in Britain. A single member plurality electoral 
system at Westminster, an adversarial party system, the professionalization of politics and lack of 
institutional pluralism (prior to Welsh and Scottish devolution) combine to ensure that British 
politicians are constantly concerned with winning national elections above all else. Bulpitt (1996: 
225) therefore argues that: ‘In combination, these structural characteristics of modern British 
politics have produced party elites with common, initial, subsistence-level objectives, namely 
winning national office, avoiding too many problems while there and getting re-elected’. It is 
therefore the historical and institutional context of British politics that makes party leaders 
desperate to win elections because the consequences of defeat . . . are so awful’ (Bulpitt 1988: 
188). This is significant because it fits closely with the historical institutionalist claim – in contrast 
to rational choice institutionalism – that the motives and actions of actors are dependent on a 
particular institutional setting (Adcock et al. 2007: 280). In contrast, rational choice theory takes 
preferences and motives as external and fixed. 
Fourthly, the neo-statecraft approach fits with historical institutionalism because it shares 
concerns about identifying context-dependent regularities in the world. If the approach is 
premised in realism then neo-statecraft shares realism’s aim of identifying regularities which are 
causal mechanisms, whose effects vary according to context rather than scientific laws that 
enable prediction (Sayer 2000: 14). This is also a core concern of those seeking to establish path 
dependencies or reactive sequences (Mahoney 2000; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). 
Bulpitt’s frequent reference to political historians such as Maurice Cowling (1967, 1971) has 
caused some consideration as to whether Bulpitt’s work fits better within Tory historiography. 
Mark Bevir (2010: 445–6) notes that it is from his reading of eighteenth-century British history 
that Bulpitt draws his concepts of ‘low’ and ‘high’ politics, and local and central elites. Bulpitt’s 
work also overlaps with Cowling’s focus on elite politicians who were considered as being 
motivated by ambition over principle (Craig 2010). However, Bulpitt (1996: 1093) was critical of 
the a-theoretical approach that historians often took which paid ‘little attention to political 
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science concepts and “theory”’. He therefore sought a theoretical framework with abstract 
assumptions. Moreover, the second wave of statecraft scholarship has explicitly used the 
approach as a framework for establishing regularities. James (2012) uses it as a framework for 
identifying the causes of reform of electoral institutions in a comparative perspective. McKenna 
(2012) uses his local model to understand regularities in local elite behaviour towards 
participatory initiatives. The second wave of literature therefore consolidates Bulpitt’s differences 
with Cowling, who was not interested in developing such theoretical extrapolations. Cowling 
(1980: 258) thought that history ‘knew nothing and cared less about a “natural or logical 
development” and had nothing to learn from “cause and effect”. Craig (2010: 465–75) argues that 
Cowling’s writing therefore fitted well with the work of R.G. Collingwood and Michael Oakeshott. 
The same cannot be said of Bulpitt. Bevir (2010) therefore concluded that Bulpitt was too fixed 
on ‘modernist empirical topics’ to be an interpretative historiographical approach. </bi> 
  
BEYOND HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM: THE ROLE OF AGENCY IN CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 
Neo-statecraft theory does naturally appear to be part of the family of historical institutionalist 
approaches. It is also distinct from it. Why? As noted above, according to Peters et al. (2005: 
1284), historical institutionalism ‘lacks any clearly identified source of agency’. For Mahoney, 
agency is often an unexplained ‘contingency’. However, the importance of agency is clearly 
present in neo-statecraft theory. What evidence is there of this?  
First, throughout Bulpitt’s Territory and Power ([1983]2008) and his statecraft work the 
principal agent is attributed a degree of strategic reflexivity. It is able to make strategic choices – 
even if these are affected by the structural context in which the court finds itself. Even in his 
earlier work, Bulpitt describes a range of approaches that the centre might take towards territorial 
relations. A coercive power model could be enforced through the use of threats and coercion. A 
central autonomy model could be established in which the centre seeks cooperation and 
acquiescence from the periphery. Lastly, a capital city bargaining model sees the periphery ‘on 
top’. Bulpitt suggested that the central autonomy model was more likely to be successful in the 
UK context. The choice of approaches towards centre–periphery relations is also heavily 
influenced by existing power relations and resources and past historical legacies (Bulpitt 
[1983]2008: 67–9). However, the centre does have a degree of contextual choice of strategy. 
Similarly, he writes that the statecraft that Conservative leaders developed after the mid-1880s 
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was based on their perceptions of developments such as the rise of popular government and the 
Labour Party (Bulpitt 1986a: 27). While he stressed that some statecraft strategies were rejected 
because of their weaknesses, he was clear that there is contingency because of leadership agency. 
Monetarism might have been the only option for the Thatcher administration to achieve 
successful statecraft, in his opinion (Bulpitt 1986a: 33), but it was not inevitable that it would 
accept it because Conservative leaders had made past errors. He singled out Edward Heath as a 
‘total failure on all dimensions’ (Bulpitt 1986a: 30). 
Second, in Territory and Power, change is explained through historical institutionalist 
concepts such as critical junctures, as Bradbury noted, but also the strategic activity of the court. 
For example, Bulpitt claims that the ‘old order’ of territorial relations was challenged during the 
period 1870–1926. This was because of a number of developments such as the collapse of an 
external support system, social change, the rise of popular government and demands for a new 
territorial constitution. However, the agency of the centre was also vital in determining how these 
broader developments affected territorial relations. The centre was strategically ‘reacting to some 
of these challenges, ignoring others and trying to construct or reconstruct a viable system of 
territorial management in an awkward world' (Bulpitt [1983] 2008: 112). Salisbury is attributed a 
crucial role. For Bulpitt: ‘Salisbury’s general strategy was to delay and weaken the forces of 
“aggressive democracy”’ ([1983] 2008: 114). His ‘importance [was] that he decided to pursue the 
code with renewed vigour in the latter part of the nineteenth century’ (Bulpitt [1983] 2008: 115). 
Meanwhile in the construction of l’ancien régime, Bulpitt ([1983] 2008: 136) claims that the court 
was posited with favourable circumstances in which it could ‘take advantage of this politically 
weak periphery to construct a regime more centralised than in the past’. It eventually ‘passively 
accepted’ a system ‘handed to it on a plate’ (Bulpitt [1983] 2008: 138). Individual errors and 
actions also affect political development. For example, ‘Mr Heath’s “Declaration of Perth” in May 
1968 gave a vague commitment to an elected Scottish Assembly without consulting the party in 
England’. This was as important in the decline of the dual polity as any other factor (Bulpitt [1983] 
2008: 149–50).  
Third, in later devising the statecraft approach, Bulpitt gave agency more explicit 
recognition in the model’s assumptions. A core assumption was that elites were rational, self-
interested agents. This attributes them with a degree of reflexivity in their decision-making 
process. Importantly, agents were not conceived as having full knowledge. They therefore only 
choose from a limited menu of strategies which are determined by historical, cultural and 
  13 
ideational context. But while these constraints do remain, they are still reflective and purposive 
agents. 
In summary, the centre continually finds itself in a strategically selective environment in 
which some choices are more feasible than others. However, the court still retains a degree of 
strategic choice and the decisions made reconfigure and reconstruct future institutional 
developments. This degree of agency in Bulpitt’s work goes someway beyond that given to it by 
historical institutionalists and responds to Peters et al.’s call for a theory of agency to be 
incorporated into the approach. The revised statecraft approach therefore represents an agency-
led approach to continuity and change within historical institutionalism. This stream can be 
distinguished from structure-led approaches implicit in the original work of Pierson and others.  
BRINGING ELECTORAL POLITICS BACK IN 
One advantage of the statecraft approach is that it brings the imperatives of electoral politics back 
into the analysis of institutional change and stability and allows public administration and 
executive politics to be reconnected. According to Peters et al. (2005: 1283): ‘most scholars 
working in [the historical institutionalist] . . . approach, especially those focusing upon the state, 
overemphasize the importance of civil servants and bureaucrats in policymaking processes, 
belittling excessively the continuing (and on occasions elemental) significance of politicians as 
creative actors’. 
The role of politicians as creative actors in policy change has often been neglected as part of the 
growth of public administration as a sub-discipline. According to Lodge and Wegrich (2012: 213): 
‘the study of public administration seems to have lost its focus on one of its key aspects, namely 
the contribution of politics (if not ‘power’) to the design and practice of administrative 
arrangements.’ Lodge and Wegrich (2012: 219) explain that the result has been that public 
administration has explored a range of research questions relating to public management reform 
and policy change but has not grasped the importance of political context. As a result, public 
management reform has therefore been discussed without sufficient consideration of why 
reforms were adopted at some points by politicians, but not others (Lodge and Wegrich 2012: 
218–19); the development of performance management and regulatory regimes has been 
analysed without consideration of why politicians would want such regimes that might ‘illustrate 
their lack of progress’ (Lodge and Wegrich 2012: 219–20); and the move towards governance and 
the hollowing out of the state has been described without pointing to its ‘inherently political 
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nature’ (Lodge and Wegrich 2012: 220). They therefore make the case for the study of executive 
politics, which ‘is about the systematic study of the political factor within administrative or 
bureaucratic arrangements, and about the administrative factor in political life’ (Lodge and 
Wegrich 2012: 214).  
The statecraft approach is one framework of executive politics which brings politics to the 
fore and helps to explain a range of sources of policy change by reconnecting public 
administration with the study of comparative politics and electoral behaviour. It opens up a wider 
and untapped agenda to note how the strategic manoeuvring of the court can affect policy 
development by connecting with electoral studies and comparative politics. The court’s strategic 
attempts to achieve its support mechanisms can bring about policy change. The need to develop 
a winning electoral strategy may mean that they will, for example, quicken, slow or cancel policy 
change to fit with the electoral cycle. Blais and Nadeau (1992), for example, argue that politicians 
will tend to implement their most popular policies immediately before an election and their most 
unpopular immediately after. Likewise, courts may often seek to redress unfavourable polls with 
short-term electorate pleasers such as ‘budget give-aways’, they may undertake policy reversals 
if they appear to be unpopular or strategically respond to the policies of the opposition. The need 
to develop a perception of governing competence may explain why the court depoliticizes 
decisions by ‘tying one’s hands’ and putting policy control beyond their immediate control 
(Burnham 2001; Flinders and Buller 2006). The need for effective party management may mean 
that policy will change as a court needs to placate particular wings of its party. The uneven 
playingfield of party politics  can also affect policy. Some parties, such as business parties, can be 
disproportionately under- or over-funded (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999), which means that certain 
policy outcomes are more likely. Courts might also engage in collaborative strategies to make 
successful statecraft more likely, such as party cartelization (Katz and Mair 2009). This 
cartelization will prevent some issues entering the policy agenda or being legislated on. There is 
also empirical evidence that policy is shaped by the executive’s expected political return. Bertelli 
and John (2013) undertake a time series analysis of data from the ‘Speech from the Throne’ in the 
UK to show how governments prioritize policy areas in which they expect electoral return to be 
maximized. 
Is Bulpitt’s principal actor designation is still justifiable for researching governance in the 
advancing twenty-first century? Specifying the court as the central actor may be criticized from 
the perspective that power is fluid in democratic polities such as Britain. Furthermore, a number 
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of fundamental changes have been claimed to have taken place in policy-making in developed 
capitalist democracies which have undermined the capacity of the central state and its managers. 
Firstly, it is argued that the imperatives of globalization have affected its ability to exercise 
direction over policy, particularly over the economy and welfare (Ohmae 1990; Strange 1996). 
Secondly, governance has become more multilayered between local, national, regional and 
European levels (Brenner 2004). Thirdly, the development of information and communications 
technology (ICT) systems brought about a rapid flow of cross-border information which made 
power more dispersed and fragmented (Castells 1996). Fourthly, the introduction of new public 
management reforms has been said to reduce the governing capacity of the central state. The 
privatization and contracting-out of public services, coupled with a proliferation of QUANGOs has 
increased the number of policy actors involved in making decisions. There has therefore been a 
perceived need for ‘joined-up government’ (Davies 2009). These collective changes have been 
said to have brought about the ‘new governance’ where central national executives have become 
less active in the making of decisions over public policy (Rhodes 1997). Britain, the subject of 
Bulpitt’s analysis, has therefore been described as a differentiated polity. Focusing on the court 
may seem to be an outdated approach. 
That said, there are several reasons why a centre-approach might be useful. First, the 
national state is not necessarily in demise, so its focus remains important. There is a countervailing 
literature to the hypoglobalist school of thought that makes the case that the importance of 
globalization on national policy discretion is often exaggerated, at least in some states. Central 
government managers have often been the ‘midwives’ of internationalization (Hirst and 
Thompson 1999; Weiss 1998). Second, recent literature on networks questions the pluralistic 
nature of contemporary governance that is often portrayed. Greenaway et al. (2007) suggest that 
policy-making through networks is not as democratic as its proponents suggest. Their case of 
private finance initiative (PFI) projects under New Labour revealed how ‘powerful actors, or policy 
entrepreneurs, with their own agenda, still have the facility, by exercising power and authority, 
to shape and determine the policy outputs through implementation networks’ (Greenaway et al. 
2007: 717) A significant degree of central government power and local elite domination were 
present, they suggested. Marsh (2008) and Davies (2009, 2011) also separately question the 
fluidity of power in networks. Policy network theory implies that there is cooperation and trust 
between actors. However, networks often have asymmetric power relations and look more like 
hierarchies.  
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Moreover, Bulpitt did not always see the centre as necessarily being particularly strong, or 
at least, this assumption was not pivotal to his model. His approach to territorial politics was built 
on the criticism that many previous approaches saw the centre as having power that it did not 
necessarily have. The centre was frequently considered to be in a weak position. This was why it 
was less likely to be able to control the periphery and allowed it considerable discretion over 
policy issues.  
A more significant challenge is whether the approach of statecraft theory is helpful in 
contexts other than Britain. Statecraft was argued by Bulpitt to be necessary because of the 
adversarial institutional dynamics of Westminster politics. It follows that the approach would 
appear to have equal utility in other countries that had similar parliamentary-plurality – ‘winner-
takes-all’ constitutional frameworks with strong executives – because the electoral imperatives 
that drive statecraft remain. Obvious examples would be Australia, Canada and New Zealand, 
although Lijphart’s majoritarian-consociationalist framework (1999) provides one crude way of 
identifying such polities. This implies, however, that the approach might be of less utility in polities 
characterized by multiparty coalitions, consensual, inclusive and accommodative decision-
making, such as the Netherlands, because the Darwinian logics of electoral survival are not the 
same and elites might behave differently. This might not necessarily be true, however, because 
competitive elections might be sufficiently important in informing decision-making. Coalition 
partners are still concerned about the public’s perceptions of governing competence and need to 
manage their party effectively. A more significant reason why the approach might be less useful 
in these polities is that the approach ceases to offer parsimony. In polities characterized by 
multiparty politics, where many parties can play a role in government, which court do we study? 
There might be a need to study the statecraft strategies of all parties. Focusing on the court(s) is 
still worthwhile because it brings their strategic behaviour into focus as a source of policy change. 
However, it is a messier exercise. We are less likely to find powerful central actors who can readily 
break institutional path dependencies. 
A second reason, not considered by Bulpitt, for why the statecraft approach works so well 
in the UK is that it has a top-down political culture. As Marsh et al. (2003: 310) note, there is a 
tendency in the study of British politics to ‘focus on institutions and play down the importance of 
ideas and culture’. However, according to them, Britain has a distinct politico-administrative 
culture. This is characterized by a limited liberal conception of representation and a conservative 
notion of responsibility where ‘government knows best’, the notion of parliamentary sovereignty 
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in which the executive is ‘executive is accountable to the voters at periodic free and fair elections 
and to parliament between elections’ and an ‘obsession with strong, decisive, necessary action 
with limited scrutiny’ (Marsh et al. 2003: 311, 312). This top-down culture therefore makes the 
court the logical focus of analysis for policy change because it accepted to be the key actor within 
the political system. It follows, therefore, that the statecraft approach will be most useful in 
explaining institutional change in other political systems where a top-down culture accompanies 
institutional centralization. This might apply not only to other majoritarian democracies, but also 
to semi-democratic states and electoral autocracies. 
A MACRO APPROACH 
A third advantage of using Bulpitt’s work to explain policy change is that it provides a macro 
perspective to understanding institutional change. Theories of policy change are commonly 
categorized as being either meta- or macro-, meso- or micro-level theories. New institutionalist 
theories are generally recognized as being meso: ‘middle range or bridging level of analysis’ 
(Parsons 1997: 85). As Evans and Davies (1999: 363) note, the 1990s saw an ‘upsurge of interest’ 
in meso-level analysis because of the interest in new governance (Rhodes 1996), to the extent 
that meso-level analysis ‘became the crucial analytical tool for multi-level, integrative analysis’ 
(Evans and Davies 1999: 363). The downside of meso-level analysis, however, is that it can make 
important factors in institutional change exogenous. As noted above, a common criticism of 
historical institutionalism was that it made too many causal sources of change exogenous to the 
institutions under study as either ‘punctuated equilibrium’, ‘critical junctures’ or ‘contingent 
factors’. They may therefore miss many important sources of change.  
One of Bulpitt’s core concerns was the importance of macro analysis. In his later work he 
developed a critique of mainstream British political science as suffering from, amongst other 
things, the compartmentalization of the study of British politics. Bulpitt explicitly wrote in critique 
of approaches that only analyse one part of the larger polity. This, he claims, had become the 
trend in British political science by the mid-1990s. Thus, political parties, voters and the major 
institutions of government are discussed in separation from each other. He points to how 
standard textbooks on British politics illustrate this. They are divided into chapters on ‘voters, 
parties, pressure groups, the major institutions of government plus, and these days, a number of 
policy case studies’ (Bulpitt 1995: 511). The end result is either a failure to generate a macro 
analysis integrating the polity as a whole or an inaccurate picture of the state as the arbitrator of 
these groups; in short, pluralism. Such analysis – based on a ‘bottom-up methodology’ creates 
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‘sociologism’ (Bulpitt 1995: 512). His alternative was a macro approach, which he admitted was 
difficult, since it involved ‘some knowledge about a lot of things. Hence, accusations of 
superficiality are always possible (and plausible’ (Bulpitt 1995: 515). But a macro approach would 
overcome the loss of an overall narrative of traditional methodologies. 
Bulpittian macro analysis can also sensitize us to otherwise neglected linkages between 
layers of the meta–macro–meso–micro nexus that emerge from macro political change. For 
example, at the micro level, policy continuity can be a result of deliberate non-intervention by the 
court. Bulpitt noted that the centre would often deliberately not intervene in a policy area to 
increase its chance of achieving successful statecraft. For example, he saw race relations as a 
policy area that had huge potential for political conflict in national politics. However, writing in 
1986, Bulpitt claimed that ‘[a]t no point between the late 1940s and the mid-1980s has the race 
issue occupied a continuous and important place on the national political agenda. Race conflict 
has had only a sporadic impact on the English polity’ (Bulpitt 1986b: 23). This was because the 
court had sought, and achieved, autonomy or insulation on the issue by seeking to ‘off-load prime 
responsibility for the matter to other people and other agencies’ (Bulpitt 1986b: 23). Key to this 
was the ‘peripheralisation of race problems: their injection into local government and local politics 
as operational issues’ (Bulpitt 1986b: 23). This was largely successful and was one of the ‘great 
political “jobs” of the 20th century’ (Bulpitt 1986b: 23). Meso- or micro-level analysis might 
explain change in terms of shared values or networks of policymakers. However, while the 
empirical findings from his case study of race-relations may be less than perfect, Bulpittian 
analysis uniquely refocuses the lens on otherwise overlooked strategic actors, even if their 
involvement is not immediately observable. Institutional drift may therefore occur because of 
strategic statecraft. The court may thus deliberately depoliticize or try to pass off a function to 
another actor. Bulpitt’s work therefore inspired recent work on the concept of politicization 
(Buller and Flinders 2005; Flinders and Buller 2006).  
Simultaneously, if a court believes that its strategic interests are affected by a policy issue 
in which it previously has not been a stakeholder, it will seek to intervene. One study which 
illustrates this is James’ (2010) application of the statecraft approach to UK electoral 
administration.  Electoral administration is a policy area traditionally seen as a micro issue in the 
UK. There have only been a handful of minor changes made to election administration throughout 
the twentieth century. This was a relatively minor and technocratic issue which was dealt with by 
officials in the Home Office, representatives from local government and professional associations. 
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However, from 1997 to 2007 the New Labour government began to take a political interest in the 
area because it could solve a strategic problem that it faced. Turnout was in decline in the UK and 
fewer and fewer of Labour’s ‘core vote’ were sufficiently enthused to vote on polling day. Other 
solutions such as amending the electoral system to proportional representation were a ‘no go’ 
because they would adversely affect the power of the party. In short, by tracing the interests of 
the elite and by using macro analysis, it is possible to identify how macro-level agents may 
intervene in policy areas and bring about change.  
Strategic intervention and non-intervention is also important at the meta level in 
international affairs. In the domain of foreign policy, governing competence ‘denotes the specific 
tactics employed to minimise the adverse impact of external forces on domestic politics in ways 
acceptable to the governing party, and, in the process, make life difficult for opposition groups’ 
(Bulpitt 1988: 195–6). Bulpitt further suggested that a number of ‘ploys’ can commonly be used 
to achieve governing competence on foreign policy: foreign policy successes,4 rational inactivity, 
deliberate politicization, the reversal of assignments and Britain’s role in concentric circles (Bulpitt 
1988: 195–9). Bulpitt advised that non-intervention in a range of foreign affairs was often the 
wisest approach. Public sector management reforms and the (non)presence of policy networks at 
the meso level may also owe much to the strategic activity of the court – or the historical legacies 
and unintended consequences of such activity. 
One disadvantage of a macro approach is that it is overkill – we are taking an analytical 
sledgehammer to crack a nut. We therefore lack the finer detailed analysis which comes with 
meso-level analysis. However, it is possible to combine the statecraft approach with compatible 
meso and micro theories. For example, James (2011, 2012) argues that the interest of the court 
in election administration ebbs and flows according to an issue agenda and the nature of the 
constitutional and party system. Policy triggers are identified which may make the court 
interested in election administration such as ‘administrative failure’, declining turnout or the 
availability of new technology. Micro- or meso-level factors can therefore feed-up to the macro 
level to bring about change, but they must commonly navigate through the macro level. Other 
conceptual tools from the academic literature on the policy process, agenda cycle and 
comparative political parties can therefore be used in accompaniment to examine the problem in 
hand.  
In summary, new institutionalism self-consciously focused on meso-level analysis because 
of the perceived presence in distinct policy arenas, policy communities and vertical silos in 
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government. However, a Bulpittian focus on the strategic activity of the court helps to explain 
both institutional continuity and change by identifying how this actor allows institutional drift 
provides critical junctures and therefore sensitizes analysis to new sources of institutional change. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has sought to establish where statecraft theory ‘fits’ in the search to explain 
institutional change and evaluate its added value. As C.S. Lewis ([1955] 2008: 136) said: ‘What you 
see and what you hear depends a good deal on where you are standing’; and indeed, what you 
are looking at.  Complete relativism is unhelpful for political analysis.  It is certainly the case, 
however, that the sources of institutional change that analysts see and hear depends a good deal 
on which actors they focus their study on. The statecraft approach focuses analysis around one 
critical actor. This means that the approach is open to the criticism of being reductionist because 
it misses other sites of conflict which might influence the institutional change. It may therefore 
be more likely to miss more important venues for change in contexts where the court is less 
important. Yet in many states the centre is a central actor which does have the power to break 
and shape path-dependencies. Statecraft theory allows us to identify, when, where and why it is 
or is not willing or able to try to do this and sensitizes analysis to some under-explored factors of 
institutional change. Firstly, the approach offers a nuanced critical realist model of change (and 
continuity) based in structure and agency rather than just path dependencies. It provides an 
agent-led theory of change within historical institutionalism. Most historical institutionalists fail 
to specific the key critical actor of focus and this inhibits agency. Secondly, it brings back into focus 
the importance of electoral politics which were not always clear in the work of the neo-statists. 
Thirdly, it provides a macro approach which can thereby identify unnoticed sources of stability 
and change.  
A new generation of scholarship may therefore find fresh insights from using neo-statecraft 
theory to understand continuity and change in Britain and elsewhere. Although the approach 
might be better suited to states with strong executives, this covers a huge area of the world. The 
late twentieth century witnessed a huge rise in the number of states with leaders that needed to 
win elections to maintain power, even if these elections were imperfect compared to democratic 
theory or international standards, and they governed through partly authoritarian methods 
(Levitsky and Way 2002; Norris 2013). It has been remarked elsewhere (Savage and Williams 
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2008) that the tradition of political elite theory, which included the great work from Robert 
Michels, James Burnham, Floyd Hunter and C. Wright Mills, spawned few successors. However, 
here is an elitist approach which can be adopted by comparativists.  
Grounding neo-statecraft within historical institutionalism also opens up further 
opportunities. It follows that future work using statecraft might benefit from systematically 
exploring and using the newer concepts from historical institutionalism and comparative historical 
analysis such as drift, layering and reactive sequences. These are themselves relatively 
underexplored. It certainly follows that using a statecraft approach implies developing a historical 
approach to understand the temporal development of governing challenges and how they are 
confronted.  
The reworking of ‘great texts’ is invariably controversial. Bulpitt’s work has already been 
claimed by interpretivists, as noted above. There might be objections to the use of realism and 
historical institutionalism. Although the argument here is clearly that they are well suited, such 
pluralism is good. By explicitly developing a neo-statecraft, this article aims to delineate a clear 
pathway for a new, largely unrecognized, approach to institutional change and governance which 
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NOTE 
1 This fits with the definition used by Steeck and Thelan (2005: 10–16).  
2 Adcock et al. (2007: 288) claim that historical institutionalism is ‘guided by concerns and techniques that 
are so diverse that they may border on incompatibility’, however it is possible to discern some core 
tenants. It is commonly thought to have its intellectual antecedents in the work of the neo-statists such as 
Theda Skocpol et al. (1985), who sought to Bring the State Back In and the study of American political 
development (Bridges 1984; Showronek 1982), which both developed an interest in qualitative macro-
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historical, small-n studies. Today, historical institutionalism shares much with what is also referred to as 
comparative historical analysis. 
3 Also see Mahoney and Thelan (2010). 
4 Bulpitt called these ‘conflict resolutions’ but suggested that ‘this is an up-market label for what in plainer 
English would be called foreign policy successes’ (Bulpitt 1988: 196). For the sake of clarity, it seems easier 
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